Matthew Gould and Matthew Rablen develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting
games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates
decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A general framework for
analysing country- and region-level equitability in councils is
developed under alternate assumptions regarding preference
correlation and differing ex-ante and ex-post notions of equity.
Allowing for a ternary set of voting possibilities in the council, we use
our framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the
claims of those who seek to reform it.
available at http://wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/PEIO8/Gould,%20Rablen%2018.11.2014.pdf
Book: chapter 14
